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verse possession of the occupant, and notice, actual or constructive,
served upon the recipient of the equitable title, or his representatives, of the pendency of the application. But at all events the.
courts will not actually give to one person the ability to perpetrate
a wrong upon another, merely because Congress has neglected to
furnish a proceeding by means of which the right may be affirmJ. B. McL.
atively enforced.
Bellefontaine, 0.
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Supreme Court of .Errors of Connecticut.
KIRSCINER v. CONKLIN.'
The relative rights and duties of parties who endorse a promissory note for the
accommodation of the maker, are the same as in tliecase of a business note. A
subsequent endorser who pays it, may recover of a prior endorser the whole amount
paid, and not merely a contribution, as in the case of sureties.
And it makes no difference that the endorsers both knew that dach was an accommodation endorser, so long as there was no actual agreement between them to
share the liability.
Nor in the absence of such an agreement, that the object of the endorsements
was to enable the maker to get a loan at bank upon the note, and that they were
to operate together as a security to the bank.
ASSUMPSIT by a second endorser against a prior endorser of a
promissory note; brought to the City Court of the city of New
Haven, and tried on the general issue closed to the court, with
notice of the defence hereinafter stated. The following facts were
found by the court:The note in question is dated April 8th 1872, and is for $450
payable in three months at the New Haven County Bank. It was
made by John Rathgeber, and endorsed first by Conklin, the defendant, who was an accommodation endorser, and then endorsed
by the plaintiff, who was also an accommodation endorser. It was
duly presented for payment and protested for non-payment, and
notice duly given to the plaintiff and the defendant. The note was
afterwards, and before the present suit was brought, paid by the
plaintiff.
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This note was the last of a series of renewals, the first note being
made in 1871, and being renewed from time to time, until the note
in suit was given. It was originally for $500, but Rathgeber on
the 8th of April 1872, paid $50 on it, reducing it to $450, and
the renewal note in question was given for that amount.
Rathgeber applied in 1871 for a loati from the New Haven
(ounty Bank of $500, which was refused unless he would furnish
endorsers. He therefore procured the defendant to endorse the
note, and subsequently procured the plaintiff to endorse also, both
knowing that they were accommodation endorsers. The plaintiff
in fact relied upon the endorsement of Conklin, when he endorsed
the note, and would not have endorsed'it if it had not been previously endorsed by the defendant. All of the renewal notes were
endorsed by both plaintiff and defendant as accommodation endorsers, they knowing the fact, and the plaintiff endorsed the
renewal notes on the strength of and relying upon the name and
endorsement of the defendant, although on some of the renewal
notes the plaintiff endorsed the notes first in point of time for the
sake of convenience, Rathgeber happening to find the plaintiff before
he did the defendant; but in every case the defendant endorsed
above the plaintiff, as the first endorser, conformably to an understanding of the parties; but the court did not find that the plaintiff
and defendant ever expressly agreed that this should be so. The
note in suit was endorsed first by the defendant, and then secondly
in point of time by the plaintiff. Both plaintiff and defendant
knew that all of the renewal notes grew out of the original transaction, and that all the endorsements were accommodation endorsements for Rathgeber, to enable him to get the money from the
bank. All the notes were payable to Conklin's order.
Conklin held a mortgage security on some machinery, as an indemnity to him and others for his and their liability on these notes
and others similarly situated. This security was afterwards converted into stock in a joint stock corporation, and the stock was
held as a substituted indemnity in place of the mortgage. The
mortgage and stock have never been sufficient to fully pay the notes
endorsed. The stock is worth at least fifty cents on the dollar, and
the defendant expects it to materially rise in value. This note and
another similarly situated are for $6500, and the par value of the
stock is $6000, None of the stock has yet been converted into
cash.
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The plaintiff believed when he endorsed the note in suit, that
the defendant woul be liable to pay the note if protested for nonpayment, in the same manner as he would if it had been regular
business paper and not accommodation paper, and that he as a
subsequent endorser could compel the defendant to pay the note as
a prior endorser; and that he would not have endorsed the note
but for this belief. It was however admitted by the plaintiff that
the defendant had not said or done anything to induce this belief.
The plaintiff has no security for this endorsement other than the
interest, if any, which he may have in the stock now held by the
defendant. He did not understand that the mortgage and stock
were held as security for his endorsement directly, but that they
were primarily for Conklin's benefit, and that thereby they might
benefit him.
Upon these facis the defendant claimed that the law was such
that the plaintiff could not recover of him, another accommodation
endorser, though he the defendant was a prior endorser; but the
court did not so rule, but found for the plaintiff to recover of the
defendant the whole sum with interest. The defendant moved for
a new trial.
1rrzqht, in support of the motion.
1. The relations of the parties to the note in suit are such as to
create a contract of joint guarantee and suretyship ; and when such
contract exists there can be no recovery by a subsequent accommodation endorser against a prior accommodation endorser: TalCott v. Gogswell, 3 Day 512; McDonald v. Mifagruder, 3 Peters
474. Whether such joint contract of suretyship existed or not is
a question of fict: Talcott v. Cogswell, supra. The record finds
that the defendant held a mortgage security as an indemnity to
him and the plaintiff for the payment of these endorsements and
that the plaintiff was to share this security. The effect of the
finding is, that a mortgage was given for their joint benefit, because
they were jointly liable as sureties.
2. There is no assumpsit between the plaintiff and defendant,
upon the facts found, but there is a direct guarantee to the bank
by each, several in its character, whereby the idea of liability to
each other in the order of their respective endorsements is wholly
excluded.
3. The plaintiff obtained no iew rights against the defendant
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by paying the bank, and taking up the note, after Rathgcber had
failed to pay it : Devlin v. Brady, 36 New York 531. Nor does
it help him that he believed Conklin was liable to him as first endorser.
Alling, contra. cited Bacon v. Burnhan, 37 New York 614;
Youngs v. Ball, 9 Watts 139; Wilson v. Stanton, 6"Blackf. 507;
M1cNeilly v. Patcdn, 23 Misso. 40; Are Cane v. Belt, 45 Id. 174.
PARK, J.-In the ease of Church v. Barlow, 9 Pick. 547, the
court held that the relative rights and duties of parties who endorsed a promissory note for the accommodation of the maker are
the same as in the case of a business note, so that the notice of the
dishonor of such accommodation note having been given, a subsequent endorser who takes up the note may recover of a prior endorser
the whole amount paid, and not merely a contribution as in the
case of sureties. The doctrine of this case is fully sustained byihe
following authorities: Shaw v. Knox, 98 Mass. 214; MlcDonald
v. M4agruder, 3 Peters 470 W
TVood v. Bepold, 3 Harris & J.
125; Brown v. M1ott, 7 Johns. 361; Clapp v. Rice, 13 Gray
403; Howe v. M1.errill, 5 Cush. 88; Talcott v. Cogswell, 3 Day

512; JoLson v. Crane, 16 N. Hamp. 68.

There is no foundation in the case for the claim made by the
defendant on the trial in the court below, that the relation of the
plaintiff and defendant to the note in question was that of joint
guarantors and co-sureties. The case expressly finds that there
was no agreement between them when the original note was endorsed by them, or at the time of any of the subsequent renewals
of the note, that they should hold any other relation towards each
other than what would result from their being successive endorsers
of the note for the accommodation of the maker. It is true that
co-sureties are bound only to contribute equally to the debt they
have jointly undertaken to pay, but in that case their undertaking
must be joint, and not separate and successive, as in the case at
' bar. The plaintiff and defendant might have become joint endorsers if they had been so disposed. Their promise might have been
a joint one, but they saw fit to endorse the note separately and
successively in the usual mode. No communication took place
between them which varies the legal liabilities such endorsements
are known to create. The claim of the defendant is based upon
the bare fact that these parties knew each other to be accommoda-
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tion endorsers; but this fact falls far short of being sufficient to
create an agreement between them to be jointly liable. Such
knowledge is just as consistent with the theory of a separate undertaking, as it is with that of a joint liability.
Indeed the case finds that the plaintiff never -would have endorsed
the original note or any of its renewals if he had not believed that
the liability of the defendant on the notes was the same as it would
have been on regular business paper, and that lie endorsed the
notes relying upon the defendant's responsibility as first endorser.
Such being the case there could not have been an agreement
between them to become jointly bound on the notes. Furthermore,
when the defendant endorsed the original note it does not appear
that he knew that the plaintiff was to be another accommodation
endorser. For aught that appears the application of.the maker of
the note to the plaintiff to become an endorser was all an afterthought.
We think it is clear that there was no joint undertaking between
these parties, and we therefore do not advise a new trial.
The foregoing opinion, we think, takes
the only sound or sensible view of the
law, and we are gratified to present to
our readers so straightforward and common-sense an exposition of the law upon
this heretofore somewhat vexed question.
We cannot say that the established authority upon the point has ever departed
essentially from the track so clearly
marked out in the principal case, but
there has been more or less misunderstanding and consequent misapplication
of the plain rule here declared, as the
cases cited in favor of the new trial tend
to show ; and they might be almost indefinitely extended. The question is
considerably discussed by IsHAs!, J., in
Banc v. .Rathbone, 26 Vt. 19, and by the
present writer, in Keith v. Goodwin, 31
Vt. 268, in both of which cases the English and American authorities are extensively considered.
The truth is that no amount of authority ought ever to reconcile any court to
giving the contract of the parties a construction different from that which its

terms import. But upon the question of
suretyship there seems to have extensively prevailed an opinion, that all
sureties must be held jointly and equally,
as between themselves, and so compelled
to contribute equally to any loss in consequence of the failure of the primary
and real debtor to pay the debt, without
regard to the terms or conditions upon
which their undertaking of suretyship is
based. And this seems to have been
inferred from some of the general expressions used in the leading case of
Dering v. Earl of lVinchelsea, 1 Cox
318; 8. c. 2 B. & P. 270; 1 White &
Tudor's Lead. Cas. in Equity 78. But
of course any general expressions there
used can only have application to similar
cases, where the contract of suretyship
is the same by all the sureties. In that
case different bonds, in the same sum,
were signed by different sureties, for the
faithful conduct of the same person as
an officer of the customs, and the court
held that all the sureties were hound to
contribute equally toward any loss vis-
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ited upon any of the sureties. And this
is here placed by the court upon the
ground of general equity and not of contract. All of which is most unquestionable as to cases of that or similar character; bat it has no application to cases
where different classes of sureties undertake, not for the principal directly, but
for each other, in succession. Thus
Chief Baron EYRE said, in the last case
cited, " We shall find that contribution
is bottomed and fixed on general principies of justice, and does not spring from
contract; though contract may qualifg it,
as in Swain v. Wall, 1 Ch. Rep. 149."
This last proposition contains the pivot
upon which the law of suretyship turns.
It is the equity arising out of the understanding between the parties at the time
they become sureties.
1. It is upon the ground of implied
contract, that the sureties in a bail-bond
given for the principal debtor, cannot
recover any portion of what they may be
compelled to pay upon their bond, of the
sureties for the debt in suit. Their undertaking is not for the same thing and
not in privity with the sureties for the
debt, it being only for some independent
incident: Douglass v. Fogg, 8 Leigh
588; Patterson v. Pope, 5 Dana 241 ;
cases cited in American note to I Lead.
Cas. in Equity 158.
2. But the sureties for the payment of
the original debt, after payment of it,
may recover upon the bail-bond against
the sureties, in the name of the creditor,
for any default of the debtor, since the
suit is for the ultimate benefit of the
sureties as much as the creditor: Parsons v. 13raddock¢, 2 Vernon 608; Sir

3. If, after a debt is secured by one
set of sureties the creditor take another
bond or contract for its payment in default of the payment by the debtor or
any of the sureties already obligated, the
first set of sureties will stamnd as joint
principals towards all the sureties ill the
second class: Craythorne v. Swinlurqe,
14 Vesey 160. See also Legraenge v.
Mirrell, 3 Barb. Ch. 625; IThirris v.
Warner, 13 Wend. 400; Thompson v.
Sanders, 4 Dev. & Batt. 404.
4. And the same rule extends to
commercial paper, made for the accommodation of one of the parties. An endorsee may go against the maker or a
prior endorser for full indemnity, notwithstanding that such parties are mere
sureties of the real debtor, nal that
known to the plaintiff at the time he endorses the note. So too if the security
is made in the tbrm of a bill, the principal debtor being the drawer, and other
parties accepting or endorsing the same,
in the absence of any express contract,
each of the sureties will be entitled to
claim the benefit of all legal intendmeats in his favor, and can only be
holden to indemnify such parties as the
law regards as his sureties upon ordinary
commercial paper, notwithstanding he
may know, at the time of becoming such
party, that the paper was for the accommodation of the drawer: Smith v. Smith,
I Dev. Eq. 173. So also where one
merely guaranties a note, made and endorsed by others, none of the former
parties can enforce contribution against
him : Langley v. Greqgs, 10 Pick. 121.
See also cases cited in Keith v. Goodwin,
supra. But of course all this may be
WIVLIAms
GRANT, M. R., in Wright v.
controlled by the contract or understandMorley, 11 Vesey 12, 22. In .Bagden v. ing of the parties, and more commonly
Nca$ger, 12 Gill & Johns. 358, this is is, perhaps.
I. F. R.
denied, but with no good reason.
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Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.
BOARDMAN'S APPEAL.
By an ante-nuptial contract between B. and L. in 1857, B. agreed that certain
bank and other stocks, then conveyed by him to a trustee, should be held by the
trustee for the sole use of L. during her life, and be subject to any disposition she
might make of them by will or written appointment; the same to be in lieu of
dower and of all distributory share of his personal property if she should survive
him. Held, that the right to the income from the stocks did not, under the statute
(General Statutes, tit. 13, sec. 20), vest in the husband on the marriage, but that
it belonged to the wife as her sole and separate estate.
After the marriage in 1857 until his death in 1871, B. received the dividends
upon the stocks, upon a power of attorney from the trustee, without objection from
his wife, rendering no account to her and keeping none, she not notifying him in
any way that she should claim them as her own. It was found however that she
had never in fact intended to relinquish her right to them, and did not suppose she
had done so ; that she supposed lie was investing them for her benefit, a belief
which was strengthened by occasional expressions of his ; and that from motives
of delicacy she did not inquire of him, he being uncommunicative on all business
matters. It also appeared that the dividends were not needed or used for family
support, B.'s income from other property being far in excess of the family expenditures. Held, that she was entitled to recover their whole amount from his estate,
with interest.
A large amount of the dividends so received by B. had been from time to time
invested by him in the name of the trustee in additional stocks of the same description. In 1870 B. procured u power of attorney from the trustee and transferred to himself all the stocks so acquired, intending to convert them to his own
use. His wife had no knowledge of the transaction, and did not in fact know
until after B.'s death that the dividends from the original trust stocks lad been
invested in such additional trust stocks. Held, that her rights were not affected by
-the transaction.
B., soon after this transaction and in pursuance of a general purpose, made a
new will, in which he referred to the anie-nniri:al contract and confirmed it, and
gave to his widow his mansion-house and $20tmj for her life; stating his object
to be to make abundant provision for her suppor and comfort, in lieu of dower
It appeared from evidence outand of all share in his real and personal e~tuaw
side of the will that B. (lid not expect his widow ti make a claim upon his estate
for the dividends he had received, and that he made the foregoing provision for her
in his will in that belief; also that the provisions of the will in her favor had been
made known to her and that she had expressed herself fully satisfied with them.
Held, that it was of questionable propriety to go outside of the will for evidence
of the purpose and understanding of the testator; but that the will, taken by itself,
or in connection with the facts stated, did not make the acceptance ofits provisions
by the widow a bar of her right to present a claim against the estate for an indebtedness.
And held, that her right to any portion of the sums received by B. as dividends
was not barred by the Statute of Limitations.

T is was a claim of Mrs. Boardman against the estate of her
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deceased husband, growing out of an ante-nuptial contract entered
into by them, a few days before their intermarriage.
The parties were married on the 28th of July 1857. lIe was
then sixty-four, and she thirty-eight years of age. ie had an estate
of nearly or quite half .a million of dollars, and she a patrimony
of about six thousand dollars. lie died on the 27th of August
1871, and his will bears date on the 19th of March 1870. The
inventory of his estate is $1,110,190.05.
By the ante-nuptial contract above referred to Mr. Boardmanconveyed to a trustee some shares of stock, to be held in* trust,
"for the sole use and benefit of said Lucy [afterwards Mrs. Boardman] during her life ; and after her decease, to be subject to such
disposition as the said Lucy, by will, or by any proper appointment
in writing, may direct." The agreement then proceeds as follow:
"It is further agreed and settled that tle property and estate now
appertaining and belonging to the said Lucy shall be and remain
hers, to her own sole and separate use and disposition, to all intents and purposes. It is also further understood and agreed,
in consideration of the premises, that in the event of the demise
of the said William, leaving the said Lucy surviving, she will not
claim or receive any dower in the real estate of the said William,
wherever situated, nor any distributory share in his personal property, except as the same may be devised or bequeathed to her in
the last will and testament of the said William ; the provision in
this marriage settlement being intended and accepted in lieu and
in full of dower, and of widow's statutory rights, in both the real
and personal property of the said William W. Boardman."
The dividends on these shares of stock, accruing after the date
of this contract, were received by Mr. Boardman up to the time of
his death, when they amounted, with interest, to between eighty
and ninety thousand dollars. Whether or not his estate should
be held liable to pay these dividends to Mrs. Boardman, was the
question to be decided.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
FOSTER, J.-The case has been very ably, indeed exhaustively,
argued. If the first claim on the part of the appellant be well
founded, the question is shortly disposed of. That claim is, that
the right to the income from these stoclks being in Mrs. Boardman
at the time of the marriage, that right thereupon became vested in
her husband, during his life, by force of the statute; that his right
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to these dividends was absolute and no valid claim for them can
exist against his estate.
We must dissent altogether from this proposition. The language
of this contract is clear and explicit. Its object and intent are too
apparent to be mistaken; and the committee finds that it was executed, "as and for a valid and binding agreement upon the parties,
for the uses and purposes therein mentioned." Out of Mr. Boardman's very ample estate he carved this comparatively small portion,
and conveyed it to a trustee to be held for the sole use and benefit
of her who was to become his wife, during her life; giving her the
power of disposing of the same by will, or by any proper appointment in writing. This was received and accepted in lieu of dower,
and in fall discharge of all claims to any distributory share in his
estate, should she survive him: which in the ordinary course of
nature, was certainly to be expected.
We can have no doubt but that the income of this property belonged to Mrs. Boardman as her sole and separate estate. Such
is the reading of the contract, which does not require, and scarcely
admits of construction: Bell on the Law of Property of Husband
and Wife 473, 475. The situation of the parties and the subjectmatter of the transaction may very properly be brought into view
to aid in determining the legal effect of a contract. Having
abundant means, which were rapidly increasing, Mr. Boardman
was no doubt desirous of making adequate provision for his wife
in the event of his death, and at the same time of leaving his estate
unencumbered by any claims for dower. So he was induced to
make this settlement. Mrs. Boardman, in accepting it, even with
its probable accumulations, was manifestly giving up a large portion of what the law, in the event of his death, she surviving, would
pronounce hers. In the case of -Demzingv. Williams, 26 Conn. 226,
this court recognised a distinction between a gift or a conveyance
to a wife by a stranger and by a husband. Words of exclusiveness
are necessary in the case of a stranger; otherwise, the unity of
husband and wife would carry to the husband alone a gift of personal property made to the wife; but when the husband himself
makes the conveyance, the wife takes a sole and separate estate
without express words to that effect. As the parties contemplated
immediate marriage, this settlement should be construed in light
of this principle. The case of .fassey v. Bowen, Law Reps. 4
Eng. & Irish Ap. Cas. 288, one of the 'most recent cases, per
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haps the most recent decided in the Iouse of Lords, where the
doctrine of separate estates was very fully investigated, holds that
the word " sole" has not a fixed teclnical meaning in a will ; but
that it may have in a marriage settlement. The doctrine of this
case strongly supports, as we think, the construction which gives
Mrs. Boardman a separate estate under this contract. To claim
that, by virtue of his rights as her husband, Mr. Boardman was
entitled to the dividends on these stocks, is to do violence to the
language of this contract, and to defeat the very object which the
parties designed to accomplish. We hold that these dividends were
the sole and separate property of Mrs. Boardman, and being hers
by an ante-nuptial contract, they continued hers after marriage,
precisely as if she had remained a feme sole: Imlay v. Huntington, 20 Conn. 146 ; West v. floward, Id. 587. To hold, as we
must, that by the terms of this settlement this widow is barred of
her dower in this large estate, and then not permit her to call bFer
own the income of the fund expressly secured to her and accepted
by her in substitution, would be, indeed, the grossest injustice.
As Lord IAnDwI KE pithily asked in 17rcll v. hope, 2 Atk. 558,
we would ask here, "'to what end should she receive it, if it is the
property of her husband the next moment ?"
The record shows that, from time to time, after the marriage,
Mr. Boardman procured orders from the trustee of this property,
who was his sister, and collected the dividends declared, as they
fell due, through his bankers in New York, who placed them to
his credit, with other funds of his on deposit with them. That
Mr. Boardman was accountable for these dividends during his life,
and that his estate became chargeable after his death, payment
over not having been previously made, is a necessary result of
what we have already said, and must, indeed, be considered as
settled on well established principles: Walker v. Walker, 9 Wallace 743.
It is insisted however, on the part of the appellant, that there are
various most satisfactory reasons why this claim against the estate
of Mr. Boardman cannot be maintained, even if the original right
to these dividends, under this marriage settlement, be conceded to
Mrs. Boardman.
Mr. Boardman was permitted to receive these dividends during
his life, with Mrs. Boardman's knowledge, and without objection
or interference from her. le received and used them as his own,
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keeping no account with his wife in respect to them, and rendering
her no account of them ; and though she was aware that he was
go taking and using them, she never called upon him, or the
trustee, for any account of them, or expressed any dissatisfaction
with the course that was being pursued, or gave any notice of an
intention to claim them as her own. We are referred to dihers
highly respectable authorities, elementary writers and decided
cases, by the appellant's counsel, to show that under such circumstances the law implies her assent, and that at his death this income
belonged to his estate.
We deem it unnecessary to go into any examination of these
authorities, for the reason that other facts, found by the committee, exert a paramount influence, and render the principles contended for inapplicable to the case before us.
The committee finds that Mrs. Boardman supposed and believed
that this income belonged to her ; that she had a general impression from the tenor of the contract that these dividends were to be
invested and accumulate for her benefit and form an estate for her
after her husband's death; that she never intended to relinquish
her legal rights under the ante-nuptial contract, and never supposed that she had done so ; that she never in fact relinquished
any of them, unless such relinquishment may be legally inferred
and implied from other facts found, and from her acceptance of
the provision made for her in his will.
The committee further finds that Mrs. Boardman was not much
acquainted with business affairs, and had perfect faith in the good
judgment and great caution of her husband; that he was not in
the habit of talking with her in relation to his business transactions
or investments; and that she, from motives of delicacy, never
questioned him in relation to matters which he seemed to prefer
not to make a subject of conversation. On some occasions Mr.
Boardman sent orders by his wife for the trustee to sign, saying
"they are orders for your dividends." Some three or four years
after the marriage, Mr. 3oardman had a negotiation with a gentleman in New Haven for the purchase of a block of buildings in
that city. He informed his wife that he was about to make such
a purchase with some of her dividends. She asked where, and lie
informed her. Soon after he told her that the owner refused to
sell. About the same time, in speaking of the Southern States,
and the probability of their repudiating their bonds, he said to
VOL. XXII.-32
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her, "Now you will be glad you have none of those Mobile bonds."
It is found that Mrs. Boardman understood these remarks, in
reference to her dividends and investments, as implying that he
was, in some vay, investing them for her benefit.
On the shares of stock in the Delaware & Hudson Canal Company, stock dividends were made at three several times, amounting
in the aggregate to one hundred and ninety-nine shares. Fifteen additional shares were also distributed on the stock held in the Bank
of New York. The trustee received the certificates for these additional shares with the knowledge of Mr. Boardman. One hundred and thirty-three shares in the Delaware & Hudson stock were
subject to a payment of sixty dollars per share, which was made by
the bankers of Mr. Boardman, by his direction, out of funds in their
hands. One hundred dollars per share was in like manner paid,
and in the same way, on the fifteen shares of additional stock in
the Bank of New York; the dividends previously received bylMr.
Boardman, from the trust funds, in each of those institutions,
being greater than the amounts so paid. In August 1860, Mr.
Boardman purchased, through his bankers, for and on account of
said trust, fifty shares of stock in the Continental Bank in the
city of New York. These shares were transferred to the trustee
by his bankers August 27th 1860. The dividends on said trust
stocks exceeded at that time the amount of the purchase. It is
expressly found that this investment was made in consequence and
on account of the dividends received from said trust stocks, and as
a partial investment thereof, for the use and benefit of his wife.
All these shares stood in the name of the trustee, down to the
14th of February 1870, when Mr. Boardman procured some of
them to be transferred to himself by virtue of powers of attorney
previously procured from the trustee.
In face of these facts it surely cannot be said that Mrs. Boardman, knowingly and intentionally, gave up her right to these dividends. There was no relinquishment, no abandonment. She was
aware that her husband collected them and disposed of them, and
she assented to it. There are numerous cases, and of the highest
authority, in which it has been held that when the wife permits her
husband to receive the profits of her separate estate, they living
together, and he paying all the expenses of their domestic establishment, the presumption of law is, that it was the intention of the
wife to make a gift of those profits to her husband. There are
many cases where in consequence of these receipts of the income
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of the wife's separate estate, the husband is induced to live at
greater expense than he otherwise would have done ; thus increasing the comforts of their home, perhaps procuring luxuries for his
wife as well as for himself. To call the husband to account, after
a lapse of years, for moneys thus expended, or to make a claim on
his estate, after his death, in favor of the wife, would obviously be
unjust. The case at bar differs widely from all such cases. Mrs.
Boardman assented to the collection of the dividends on her separate estate by her husband, and to the disposition of them by him.
Was her assent given to an expenditure of these dividends for
her support, or for that of the family ? On the contrary, it is expressly found that she supposed he was investing them for her
benefit. His own declarations to her, with other facts found by
the committee, clearly warranted her in entertaining such a supposition at the time; and from proofs now made, the fact is established beyond doubt or controversy, that this trust fund was increased by these dividends from time to time after the marriage,
till the year before the death of Mr. Boardman. She never called
for an account of these investments, and made no inquiry regarding
them, during her whole married life. The reason is given by the
committee. We think it creditable to them both. Living harmoniously and happily iogether, they found other topics of conversation more interesting than a discussion as to how they bad bestowed, or how they should besto/w, their increase of goods. The
just demands of Mrs. Boardman are not to be impaired by her
having been silent rather than clamorous; a course of conduct
which, under the circumstances, we must regard as eminently
praiseworthy. Nor were Mr. Boardman's expenses affected in the
slightest degree by the receipt of these dividends. His annual expenditures absorbed but a small part of his individual income.
The right of Mrs. Boardman to these dividends during her married life, as her sole and separate estate, being established, we discover, as yet, no reason why her claim against the estate is not
just and valid. The liability for interest perhaps necessarily follows; it certainly does in this case, for interest was received. A
few additional questions, bearing upon the main fact, remain however to be considered.
On the 31st of January 1870, Mr. Boardman procured from
the trustee powers of attorney to convey one hundred and ninetynine shares of stock in the Delaware & Hudson Canal Company,
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the accumulation on the original two hundred shares; fifteen shares
of stock in the Bank of New York, additional to the original hundred and twenty shares ; and fifty shares of stock in the Continen tal Bank, previously purchased on account of the dividends received
from said trust stocks, and as a partial investment of the same for
the use and benefit of his wife. On the 14th of February 1870,
acting under these powers of attorney, Mr. Boardman caused these
shares of stock in the Delaware & Hudson Canal Company and in
the Continental Bank, to be transferred to himself; and on the
11th day of April 1870, he caused the shares in the Bank of New
York to be transferred to himself by virtue of the same power.
And it is found that, at the time he applied for and obtained said
powers of attorney, and transferred said stocks, he intended thereby to convert the same to his own use, so that neither said stocks,
nor the dividends received by him upon said original trust stocks,
should go to the use and benefit of his wife, but should belong to
and form part of his estate. Of all these transactions, indeed of
the existence of these stocks, as accumulations of, or as belonging
to, the trust funds, Mrs. Boardman was wholly ignorant until after
his death.
We cannot regard these acts of Mr. Boardman as materially
affecting the rights of Mrs. Boardman. At the most, they amount
to no more than an assertion of his rights, as he understood them,
to those trust funds and accumulated dividends; his construction
of the ante-nuptial contract. It should be borne in mind that
during all his previous married life, then approaching thirteen
years, he had given this contract a totally different interpretation ;
had recognised and treated these dividends as she had, as hers, not
as his. This late, sudden and unexplained change of views,
wrought out in secret, so far as she was concerned, cannot and
should not increase any right of his or diminish any right of hers.
But the will of Mr. Boardman, made in connection with these
transactions, on the 19th of March 1870, makes provision for
Mrs. Boardman, which, it is insisted, she cannot accept, as she has
done, and also be entitled to the allowance of this claim.
In the first item of this will the testator says:-" The settlement
I made with my dear wife, Lucy H. Boardman, before our intermarriage, in lieu of dower, is hereby confirmed ; and in addition to the
provision therein made for her, I hereby give and devise to her the
mansion-hotise, grounds," &c., &c. Then follow other bequests;
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then this clause :-" My intention and object was and is, to make
abundant provision for the support and comfort of my dear wife,
by the three preceding items, in lieu of dower, or share in my
real or personal estate." Ile then disposes of the residue of his
estate, making no other or further allusion to his wife.
While it is quite plain that by accepting the provision made for
her in this will the widow is cut off from dower, we discover nothing
in the entire document which bars her from presenting and enforcing any legitimate claim, by way of indebtedness, which she may
have against the estate. Besides, the will confirms this marriage
settlement, and directs all just claims and expenses to be paid. So
far, therefore, from finding any impediment to the payment of this
claim within the will itself, we should say, looking to that instrument alone, that the testator directed that it should be paid.
Highly respectable authorities, certainly, are not wanting to
show that we are not at liberty to go outside of what is technically
styled the four corners of a will, in a case of this description, to get
at the intention of the testator. That may be the safer and better
rule, but, as we reach the same result in either event, we prefer
not to put the case solely on that ground.
Going outside of this will, it appears that the testator did not
suppose that this claiai would be made against his estate ; that the
clauses in it relating to his widow were placed there in the belief
that it would not be made. Perhaps it is no assumption under these
circumstances to say that the testator then regarded the claim as
invalid; that if presented it would not be allowed. Had lie known
that the law would have pronounced the claim good, and that his
estate was responsible for it, can any one say that he would not
have said to his executors, pay it? But then he would have altered
his will. That is possible, but what would the alteration have
been ? Is any one warranted in saying that he would have made no
bequest whatever to his wife? If any, how much ? Taking out
this claim, his estate had more than doubled during his married
life. On reflection, is it certain that he would have diminished the
amount given to his wife?
But it is idle to wander in this field of conjecture. That the
will gives the widow the original trust fund, and certain specified
amoubts in addition, is agreed. Let the provisions of the will be
carridd out, and let this claim stand on its own merits.
But it is said that the provisions of this will, in favor of MIrs.
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Boardman, were made known to her, and that she expres;ed herself fully satisfied with them. We see nothing in that to aar this
claim. She was not asked to relinquish it, and did not suppose
that she had relinquished it. Nor do we think that the doctrine
of election applies in this case. The amount received by the resiluary legatees will, no doubt, be diminished by the payment of
this claim; but we do not think that the assertion of it violates the
familiar principle which forbids one, after taking a beneficial
interest under a will, from setting up a right or claim which shall
defeat the effect and operation of that will.
The Statute of Limitations presents no bar. As against the trustee no right of action has accrued. Mr. Boardman held this money
by power of attorney from the trustee, and was in the place of the
trustee. ie exerted no power as husband, nor as such did he
attempt to exert any, prior to 1870; when, and not before, if her
rights were not saved by coverture, the statute began to run.
We advise the Superior Court to make the corrections in the
items of this account suggested in the report of the committee;
and then to affirm the decree of the Court of Probate.
The foregoing opinion presents some
practical questions in regard to the separate property of the wife, under marriage
settlements, and agreements on the part
of the husband to keep property exclusively for her use, which have not yet
ceased to be of interest to the profession.
In the present case, where the husband's
estate was so large as not, in any sense,
to require to use the income of the wife's
separate property in the current expenses of the family, it seems very proper to hold his estate accountable for all
such income, and the interest upon it, although receired many years before his
decease, and not set apart, in any such
way, as to indicate the purpose of securing it for the separate use of the wife.
But in any case, where the income of
the wife's separate property was reasonably needful for the support of the family and had been paid to the husband
and expended by him fr that purpose,
without objection on the part of the wife,
which must be regarded as amounting to

acquiescence in such use, on her part, it
would seem very unreasonable and unjust
to demand the same rule of accountability on his part. It may be said, that
the rule of responsibility on the part of
the husband, for the income of the wife's
separate estate, must be the same in all
cases. That may be true, as a rule of
law. He is, perhaps, presumptively accountable for all which comes to his
hands, and is to be held accountable to
the same extent as any other agent.
But this accountability, as the agent of
the wife, in the receipt of the money, may
be answered by showing that the agency
also existed in regard to the expenditure
of the same. And it would be very unsatisfactory to hold, that while the family
were maintained and the wife supplied
with necessary paraphernalia and pin-money by the husband, he was all the time
to be held responsible for the same money
which she had thus expended, when his
means were so narrow that he could not
have supported his wife and family in
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the way he did without the use of the
income of her separate estate, and that
this was known to his wife at the time.
We need not refer to the cases upon this
point, since they are of almost infinite
variety, no two being alike precisely,
and some of them seeming to be decided
rather upon the principle of affording a
support for the wife and family in the
future, by placing a burden upon the hus-

band's estate, which he never expected to
bear, and which in justice to his creditors his estate ought never to bear. If
the present case involved any such principle we should desire to state the reasons of our dissent more at length. But
as no such question here arises, we shIIl
content ourselves by protesting again..t
its receiving any such application.
1. F. R.

Supreme Court of Montana.
THE TERRITORY OF MONTANA, PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT, v. 3000
FEET OF MINING GROUND, AND FOUK LEE, DEFENDANT AND ApPELLANT.
The territories, even after being organized by Congress, possess none of the attributes of sovereignty. They cannot, therefore, enact laws for the forfeiture of
lands of aliens.
The nature and extent of territorial governments discussed, their powers defined
and explained.

Tnis was an action brought under an
lature, entitled "An Act to provide for
tory of placer mines held by aliens,"
The act substantially provides that no

act of the territorial legisthe forfeiture to the terriCodified Statutes p. 593.
alien shall be allowed to

acquire any title, interest or possessory or other right to any placer
mine or claim, or to the profits or proceeds thereof in this territory,
and that whenever it shall be made to appear to any district at-

torney, that any alien is in possession, occupation, use or enjoyment of any placer mine or claim within the district of such
district attorney, or that any alien claims any right, title or interest

in or to any such mine or claim, by pre-emption, location, acquisition, or by gift, grant, bargain, sale, conveyance, transfer, assign-

ment, lease or mortgage, it shall be the special duty of such district
attorney forthwith, to institute in the District Court of the proper
county, an action in the name of the territory, against such placer
mine or claim for the forfeiture thereof to the territory.

And the

act further provides, that if upon the trial it shall be made to
appear that the mine or claim in question is occupied, possessed
or claimed by an alien, or that any right or interest therein, has
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been sought to be conveyed to or vested in such alien, or in any
one for his use or benefit, the court shall thereupon render a judgment of forfeiture to the territory of such mine or claim, of whatever right, title or interest the alien would have acquired bad he
been a citizen, and upon this judgment there shall be an execution
and sale for the benefit of the territory, and the proceeds of such
sale shall be paid into the territorial treasury for the use of the
territory.
The complaint in this case set forth the necessary averments
under this statute, alleging that the defendant Fouk Lee is an
alien and a subject of the Chinese Empire, and that he purchased
of one Stearns, and by virtue of such purchase now holds, claims,
occupies and is possessed of 3000 feet of placer mining ground in
the complaint described. There was a demurrer to the complaint
which was overruled and judgment was rendered for the plaintiff,
that the mining ground described in the complaint be forfeite& to
the territory and sold in pursuance of the provisions of the act
aforesaid. From this judgment the defendant appealed to this
court.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
WADE, C. J.-By this appeal we are called upon to determine
the validity of the statute under and in pursuance of which the
action was brought and prosecuted to judgment; and in making
this investigation it will be convenient to inquire: First, what
were the rights and disabilities of aliens in this territory prior to
the enactment of this statute. Second, as to the power of the
territorial legislature to enact a law of this character; and Third,
Is the act in question in harmony with the Organic Act of the
territory..
1st. As to the right of an alien to purchase and hold real property, it may be stated as a general principle deducible from the
authorities, that alienage is a disability that can only be taken
advantage of by the government, or the sovereign power in a state,
and that the real property purchased by an alien does not vest in
the government until office found, that is, until a proceeding before
a jury to inquire as to the question of alienage, and until such
inquiry by the government the alien is seised, and may protect
and defend his property as a citizen, and may institute actions,
and prosecute suits under the laws for this purpose, and that as to
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sales and transfers of real estate by or to aliens, they stand upon
the same footirig as sales and transfers made by citizens, subject
only to the right of the sovereign power of the government to institute proceedings to cause a forfeiture.
This proposition is sustained in 2 Blackstone 249. note 18,
wherein it is asserted that the law as to purchases by aliens is
shortly this, that the purchase vests the land in the alien, but
subject to be divested out of him for the benefit of the Crown, by
the finding of an inquisition in the Exchequer. An alien may be
grantee in a deed, though his holding is precarious, for on office
found the king shall have it by his prerogative: 2 Blackstone 293,
note 14; Coke Litt. 2 b.; 5 Co. 52; 1 Leon 47.
"If," says Lord CoKE (Co. Litt. 2), "an alien purchase houses,
lands, tenements, or hereditaments, to him and his heirs, albeit he
can have no heirs, yet he is of capacity to take a fee simple, but
not to hold, for upon office found, that is, upon the inquest of a
proper jury, the king shall have it by his prerogative, of whomsoever the. land is holden, and so it is, if the alien doth purchase
land and die, the law doth cast the freehold upon the king," but
the estate purchased by an alien does not vest in the king until
office found, until which time the alien is seised, and may sustain
actions for injuries to the property: 5 Co. 52 b.; 1 Leon. 47;
2 Blackstone 293, note 10.
An alien may purchase lands and hold them against all the
world, but the state, nor can he be divested of his estate even by
the state until after formal proceedings called "office found."
And-until that is done, may sell and convey or devise the lands,
and pass a good title'to the same: 1 Wash. Real Prop. 50, and
*authorities there cited. An alien friend is entitled at common law,
not only to take and hold real estate, until office four/d, but to
maintain an action for its recovery in case of an intrusion by an
individual: Bradstreet v. Supervisors of Oneida Co., 13 Wend.
546. In the case of MoCreery's Lessee v. Allender, 4 Harris &
McHenry 409, the Supreme Court of Maryland decided that the
title of an alien friend is good against everybody but the state,
and that his right and possession could not be divested but by
office found, or some act done by the state to acquire possession,
and judgment was given for the plaintiff who was an alien and a
British subject. See-also The People v. Folsom, 5 Cal. 578.
This question has also been passed upon by the Supreme Court
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of the United States: Craige v. Leslie et al., 3 Wheaton 563, and.
the foregoing propositions fully and clearly sustained. Alienage
then is not a disability that can be taken advantage of by a private
individual, and as between citizen and alien, their titles are equally
sacred and secure, and equally entitled to the protection of the
law. Only the sovereign power of the state or government can
demand forfeiture of an alien's property, and this authority proceeds from the right of self-protection which inheres in every
government, giving it the power of self-preservation. But this is
a great sovereign prerogative right, which belongs -only to the
supreme power in a state, and cannot be exercised by any subordinate, secondary or limited depositary of power. The authority
to naturalize, and to impose disabilities upon aliens, belongs alone
to sovereign power, and this leads us to the discussion of the
second proposition concerning the sovereignty of a territory.
2. Does the territory of Montana possess the inherent sovereign
power, necessary to enable it to cause the forfeiture to itself of
the property of aliens situate within its territorial limits ? and
does it possess the power to forfeit to its own use and benefit, property that never belonged to the territory, in which the territory
never had any interest, the title to which still remains in the
United States, subject only to a possessory easement acquired by
individuals by leave and license granted by the General Government? In other words, can the territory forfeit to its own use
and thereby become the owner of property which the government
in its liberality granted only to citizens, and to those who have
declared their intention to become such, and if there is a forfeiture
of this possessory title which the government has granted to individuals, does not the property forfeited necessarily revert back to
the General Government, the original grantor? The solution of
these questions necessarily leads to a discussion of the sovereignty
of a territory under the Constitution and government of the United
States. Before entering upon this subject, however, we wish to
premise, by saying that, primarily, the General Government is the
owner of all the soil within its territorial limits, and that it is the
fountain and source from whence all title to the soil is acquired,
and that by reason of this fact, the right of forfeiture vests in the
sovereign power of the General Government, and the particular
inquiry now is, are the organized territories belonging to the
United States, clothed with this sovereign power ?
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What do we mean by the term sovereignty? It is the exercise
of, or right to exercise supreme power, dominion, sway, and as
applied to a state, it is the right to exercise supreme power,
dominion, authority. Says Vattel in his treatise on the Law of
Nations, "Nations or states are bodies politic; societies of men
united together for the purpose of promoting their mutual safety
and advantage by the joint efforts of their mutual strength. Such
a society has her affairs and interests; she deliberates and takes
resolutions in common, thus becoming a moral person who possesses
an understanding and a will peculiar to herself. From the very
design that induces a number of men to form a society which has
its common interests, and which is to act in concert, it is necessary
that therd should be established a public authority, to order and
direct what is to be done by each, in relation to the end of the
association. This political authority is the Sovereignty." And
this sovereignty we may add is the elemental prerogative of a
nation; an essential attribute that gives to it being, life and character, and without which it can have no existence. Sovereignty
makes a nation; it forms a state, and the lack of it makes a colony,
a province, a dependence. Sovereignty implies the right to make
laws, and to enforce them, and the laws it enacts cannot be modified, altered or abolished except by the same supreme power which
enacts them. To this power belongs the authority to define the
rights of persons, and it may regulate the manner and circumstances under which property is held, and may direct the modes
of administering justice. To this power belongs the right to declare war; to raise and support arniies; to make treaties of peace,
and to use all necessary means to self-preservation and protection.
Sovereignty then signifies independence, absolute freedom and liberty, and a superiority to, and exemption from every foreign or
extraneous influence. Every nation, like every individual, possesses the inherent right of self-defence, and for this purpose it
may use or destroy the property of its citizens, and to this power
of a nation may be referred its right to make laws of escheat
and forfeiture, providing when and under what circumstances property shall become forfeited to the state. The authority to enact
laws of forfeiture is a sovereign prerogative, and belongs only to
the supreme power of a nation. Is this sovereign power lodged
in the territory of MKontana? The region of country now in
cluded within the limits of this territory was acquired by the
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United States from France by virtue of the Louisiana purchase
in 1803. Out or this vast region, thus acquired, several states
have been firne.l and admitted into the Union, while in the rest
of this territory, temporary governments have been established by
Congress preparatory to their admission as states. By what authority does Congress thus assume to exercise jurisdiction and
control over the several territories belonging to the government?
We might well argue that the right to acquire territory implied
the right to govern it, and if there was no controlling law on the
subject, it might be well said that if the United States has the
right to purchase territory from a foreign power, it could, after the
purchase, exercise absolute dominion ard authority over the property so purchased; but we arc not compelled to resort to any implied power in determining the source of authority over the territories. Section 3, Article 4, of the Constitution provides that
Congress shall have power to dispose of, and make all needful rules
and regulations respecting the territories or other property belonging to the United States. Under and by virtue of this clause of
the Constitution, from time to time, Congress has authorized and
established temporary governments for the territories, the first of
'which was provided by the Ordinance of 1787, and afterwards
adopted by Congress, and from thence continuously until the
present time. The governments thus established were and are
temporary in their character, and only designed to subserve a
temporary purpose. These governments were, and now are, and
at all times have been, under the complete control of Congress,
and subject to abolition, modification or change, at the behest of
the power which created them, and the laws enacted by the territorial legislatures are alike subject to modification or repeal by
the action of Congress. These inherent infirmities in the governments and legislative enactments of the territories, at once rob
them of all the essential attributes of sovereignty, and make them
provinces over which the United States exercises supreme control.
Under and by virtue of this clause of the Constitution above recited,
1,.,,gress could sell and dispose of a territory to a foreign power,
and not only can it make all needful rules and regulations concerning the territories, but can also abolish them, and the rules
and regulations made by Congress are enacted laws, and congressional rules for the territories can be made in no other manner.
With these sovereign powers residing in the General Government,
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it seems idle to contend that a territory is sovereign and supreme
in any department of its authority. These views and principles
seem to be well supported by authority. Chancellor KENT, Cornmenting upon the territories belonging to the United States, says,
Vol. 1, p. 427, "with respect to the vast territories belonging to
the United States, Congress have assumed to exercise over them
supreme powers of sovereignty; exclusive and unlimited power
of legislation is given to Congress by the Constitution and sanctioned by judicial decision. * * The general sovereignty existing
in the government of the United States over the territories is
founded on the Constitution, which declared that Congress should
have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations resjiecting the territories. * * * It would seem from these
various Congressional regulations of the territories belonging to
the United States, that Congress have supreme power in the government of them, depending upon the exercise of their sound
discretion."
The government of the United States, which can acquire territory by conquest, must as an inevitable consequence possess the
power to govern it. The territories must be under the jurisdiction
and dominion of the Union, or be without any government; for
the territories do not when acquired become entitled to self-government , and they are not subject to the jurisdiction of any state.
They fall under the power given to Congress by the Constitution:
American Ins. Go. v. Carter,1 Peters 511. In the sam' case,
Chief Justice MARSHALL says, that Congress legislating ior the
territories, exercises for them the combined powers of the general
and state governments. Neither can it be said that Congress in
giving to the territories an Organic Act, delegates any of its
sovereign authority, for not only can the Organic Acts be altered
or abolished, but all laws made under and by virtue thereof, by
the territorial legislatures are subject to Congressional supervision,
showing that sovereignty alone resides with Congress.
It may, however, be said that a territory is a distinct political
society, and therefore sovereign in its action, except as limited by
the Organic Act, as the states of the Union are sovereign, except
as limited by the Federal Constitution. To this it may be answered
that sovereignty does not abide with the territory for the reason
that its action is subject to approval or disapproval by a higher
authority, while Congress exercises and can exercise no authority
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whatever over the enactments of a state legislature. To the
people of a state in the Union, is secured the right of self-government, while the people of the territories have not this right, and
depend for their government on the will of Congress. The state
regulates its own internal concerns, while Congress directs the
internal affiairs of a territory. In a territory the courts have no
final jurisdiction, an appeal being allowed to the Supreme Court
of the United States in every case, only limited by the amount
involved ;" the legislature acts with limited and contracted authority, and all its laws and statutes are subject to the approval
or disapproval of Congress, and the power of the executive and
the tenure of his office are likewise subject to the sovereign power
and will of Congress and the President, and in nothing pertaining
to the existence, organization or power of a territory is it sovereign and master of itself. The General Government may sell it
to a foreign power; may abolish its government; may annel it
to another territory, or may divide or change its form of government; the executive is the mere creature of the President and
the Senate; its Organic Act creating a judiciary and a local legislature, may at any time be altered or abolished. Therefore it is,
that a territory has no sovereign power or authority -whatever, and
hence has no authority to impose disabilities upon aliens within
its limits, and much less has it the right to confiscate to its own
use and benefit their property. Laws providing for the forfeiture
of real estate, or any interest therein, while yet the title remains
in the United States, and while if any forfeiture is had the property rightfully reverts to the original owner and proprietor, do
not come within the scope of rightful subjects for territorial legislation ; for legislation upon this subject, by every analogy, belongs
exclusively to Congress. Before the passage of this act of the
territorial legislature, forfeiting the property of aliens within ihe
territory, the alien could hold, and did hold and enjoy the possessory title to mining claims, procuring such titles by purchase,
which title was an easement therein, the remainder of the title belonging to the United States, so that the alien and the government
taken together owned the complete title. The territory bad no
interest whatever in the claims held by aliens, or by any other
persons, and no title or shadow of title thereto ; but by the operation of this statute the territory becomes the owner of the possessory title which is, or may be the entire equitable interest, and
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is authorized to sell the same for its own use, so that by the force
of this statute, it becomes the owner of property in which it never
had any interest, and which never belonged to it, and it forfeits
the property of an alien and calls it its own, while if any forfeiture takes place for any reason whatever, the property thus forfeited necessarily belongs to the United States. The territory
cannot acquire title to property, that does not and never did belong
to it, so easily as this. There might be reason and plausibility in
a statute of this kind providing the territory was clothed with
sovereign power, and owned the paramount title to the property
sought to be confiscated, but in the absence of sovereignty, and
in the absence of any title or interest in the property, and while
the General Government is yet the owner of the legal title, and
while, if any interest in the property is forfeited, it naturally and
rightfully reverts to the sovereign, the General Government, who
holds the paramount title to all the property within its limits, it
certainly is an unwarrantable exercise of power for the temporary
government of a territory to undertake by forfeiture, to convert to
its own use property which, if subject to forfeiture at all, should
be forfeited to the government of the United States. Unquestionably Congress could enact and enforce a law similar in its provisions
to the one under consideration, because it is clothed with the necessary power, and because the unoccupied lands in the temtories
belong to the government, and it has the right to say who shall
possess such lands, and exercising this 'right by the Act of July
26th 1866, the government authorized citizens and those persons
who have declared their intentions to become such to enter upon,
explore and possess such unoccupied mineral lands, and if persons
not authorized by this act, enter upon such lands, or if they acquire by purchase the possessory title to the same, and thereby
the lands become subject to forfeiture, it is a matter for the General Government to take action in relation to, and in which the
territory has no right, and no interest.
It will be observed that this Act of Congress does not prohibit
citizens who rightfully acquire this possessory title, from selling
and transferring the same to aliens, or to any other persons. But
with no statute upon the subject, and by virtue of the common law,
if an alien takes a title to a possessory right in any such lands,
upon proper inquisition before a jury, or upon office found, such
title could be forfeited to the government, and this sovereign right
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belonging to the General Government, the sovereignty of the territories as to this matter is necessarily excluded. Only those persons authorized by the Act of July 26th 1866, are licensed to
enter upon, explore and possess the mineral lands belonging to the
United States. The persons given this right by virtue of this act,
are citizens, and those who have declared their intention to become
citizens. All others by necessary implication are excluded, and
this exclusion would apply to a state, or a territory, as well as to an
alien, and the very terms of the act that exclude aliens from entering, also exclude the territory from holding the possessory title
to the mineral lands, and an action .for forfeiture by the General
Government against the territory in such case would be much more
appropriate than such an action by the territory against an alien.
The territory lacks three essential elements necessary and requisite, in order to enable it to maintain this action, and in order
to give validity to this statute. First, the sovereign power Ind
authority to confiscate and forfeit to itself property, and especially
property in which it has no interest/and no title, the sovereignty
of the United States and its title necessarily excluding any action
by the territory. Second, the territory is not the party in interest,
and is officiously meddling with what does not concern it; and
Third, the inability of the territory un 1er the Act of 1866, to take
and to hold the possessory title to the mineral lands belonging to
the United States.
It is argued that this statute of the territory does not conflict
with the Act of Congress of 1866, which provides that only citi:
zens and those who have declared their intention to become citizens,
shall have the right to enter upon and possess the mineral lands;
and that this statute confiscating the possessory title of aliens is
only in aid of the Act of Congress. But it will be observed that
the Act of 1866 does not authorize the forfeiture of the title of
aliens, and if it did the forfeiture would take place to the United
States, and the territory could take no action in the matter unless
specially authorized by Congress. The territory is not called upon
to aid Congress or the executive in the execution or enforcement
of the laws of the General Government, and the voluntary aid of
the territory is without authority, without reason and therefore
void.
3. Is the statute in question in harmony with the Organic Act
: the territory ? The Organic Act provides, section 6, that the
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territorial legislature shall pass no law interfering with the primary
disposal of the soil. Notwithstanding the Organic Act, whereby a
temporary government is created for the territory, the General
Government, being the owner of the soil, still retains its ownership,
and has made all the necessary laws and regulations, directing
how its property shall be disposed of, and how title thereto shall
be conveyed. The territory can enact no valid law, that in any
manner impedes, modifies or varies the operation of the laws of the
General Government as to the disposal of its lands. Neither can
the territory do, by indirection, what it is prohibited from doing
directly, so that if any territorial statute enacted for a local, or for
a temporary purpose, in its workings, in its operations and effects,
defeats the laws of Congress as to the disposal of the public lands
of the territory, such statute is necessarily void. The statute in
question provides that the mining claims held by aliens shall be
forfeited to the territory, so that the territory becomes the owner
of the possessory title to such claim. Laying aside the fact that
the territory thus becomes the owner of property that does not belong to it, yet it obtains possession of the title, and this possession
necessarily interferes with the disposal of the soil by the United
States to the citizen or settler.
If the possessory title is forfeited, the property should again become subject to location by the persons entitled to make such location, but the territory comes forward and says by its legislature"that although the title to this property is forfeited and it thereby
becomes subject to entry and location, yet I have acquired this
property, and if any one obtains possession of it, they must purchase of me." The territory thus acquires a possessory title in
violation of the Act of 1866, and in direct violation of the Organic
Act, for the title of the territory interferes directly with the primary disposal of the soil to the citizen by the General Government.
It does not require argument or authority to demonstrate, that if
the territory holds possession of mining claims, it interferes with
the acquisition of possession by the citizen, and thereby interferes
with the disposal of the soil : and the fact that the territory is
authorized to sell its possessory title by causing an execution to
issue, does not help the matter, for by this means, the primary
disposal of the soil is transferred from the General Government to
the territory. This statute is in conflict with the Organic Act.
The Act of Congress of May 10th 1872, "to promote the deVOL. XXI=.--33
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velopment of the mining resources of the United States," in its
spirit and intention is in direct conflict with the territorial statute
under which this action was brought. The Act of Congress referred to, after defining the mode and manner by which titles to
the mineral lailds may be acquired, and providing when and to
whom patents may be issued, enacts that "nothing herein contained
shall be construed to prevent the alienation of the title conveyed
by a patent, for a mining claim, to any person whatever ;" that is.
to say, after the citizen, or those who have declared their intentions
to become such, shall have acquired title to their mining ground
from the government by patent, they shall have the right to sell
the same to any person, be he alien or citizen, Chinaman or American. If the absolute title can be thus conveyed to an alien, it
would be strange indeed if the mere possessory title or right could
not likewise be conveyed to the same individuals. If the alien is
made capable by the General Government of holding the higlhest
title, by what process of reasoning do we arrive at the conclusion,
that the territorial legislature can say that if he acquires a mere
possessory title it shall be forfeited? It was clearly the intention
of Congress by the Act of May 1872 to authorize and permit the
citizen who had obtained a patent to his mining ground, to sell the
same to aliens if he so desired, thereby to aid the development of
our mineral resources, by the use of .foreign capital; and as long
as this act remains in force, there can be no reason or validity in
or to, a territorial statute subjecting the inferior titles of aliens to
forfeiture and confiscation, while their absolute titles are made
sacred by the act of.the General Government.
The judgment below is reversed and the cause remanded.
We have read the foregoing opinion
with interest. It unquestionably contains a great deal of valuable information
upon the subject of territorial governments. The learned judge might perhaps
have added greater force to his opinion
by omitting some of the more questionable arguments, and thus have brought
his views within a much narrower compass. But there is certainly a great deal
of valuable matter in the opinion, presented in a very acceptable form, and
what one might object to another might
regard as of chief value and importance.

For ourselves the fact that all territorial governments are always in a mere
state of tutelage, subordinate in every
function to the national government,
possessing no attribute of sovereignty,
affords the most satisfactory reason why
no such'statute as here attempted to be
enacted by this territory can be upheld.
It is perplexing enough to attempt to
comprehend and define the true limits
between the national and state sovereignty. But it is too absurd to have the
territories putting in a claim for still another fraction of sovereignty, which in
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all other governments almost has been
regarded as entire and indivisible. The
territorial governments, under the United
States Constitution, are created for very
narrow and limited objects. And it argues little comprehension of those objects and great misconception of their
lowers to find them attempting to fix the
status of their inhabitants, in regard to
the title of real estate, in which the territorial governments have no interest,
and especially when by their organic law
they are specially prohibited from legislating in regard to the same.
This controversy about race and color
was no doubt intended to be put an end
to by the recent amendments of the United

States Constitution ; and it is not a little
humiliating to find so many of our wellinformed people, upon other questions,
so little able to comprehend that a Chinaman is as much a member of the great
family of man, and as such entitled to
kindness and consideration, as an African
or his descendants, or any other race.
And the attempt to measure our humanity or charity by the rule of citizenship
or alienage is but restoring the old rule
that all foreigners are barbarians. But
we are in a good school, that of experience, where it is hopeful that we may
all in time become wiser and more forL F. R.
bearing.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
RHEEM v. CARLISLE DEPOSIT BANK.
A notice of protest delivered to an endorser on Sunday is void, and does not
render him liable on the note.
The mere receipt by the endorser of the notice in a sealed envelope, even if told
what it is, doei not, without his saying or doing anything to mislead the notary,
amount to a waiver of the irregularity.
Nor does the receipt of notice in that way on Sunday amount to a valid notice
to him on Monday, though a new notice to him on that day would have been in
time.

TnIs was an action against the endorser of a draft.
The draft was protested December 30th 1870, for non-payment.
The notices of protest were sent to the Carlisle Deposit Bank

(the actual holder of the note), and received by it on the morning
of December 31st 1870. Mr. Rheem, the defendant, lived in the
same town. On the same evening on which the bank received the
notice of protest, Lewis A. Smith, the teller of the bank, went to
Mr. Rheem's house with a notice for him, but although meeting
an adult member of the family, did not leave the notice nor give
information as to the nature of his errand. On the next morning,

Sunday, Mr. Smith called again at the house, and handed Rheem
a sealed envelope containing the notice of protest, telling him
Mr. Rheem did not
that it was the "protest of the Leeds draft."
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open the envelope, but threw it in his desk, and did not see it
again for several weeks.
The jury found a verdict for. plaintiff, subject to the opinion of
the court on the question reserved at the trial: "As plaintiff had
by law Monday, the 2d January 1871, to give this notice of protest to defendant, was the delivery of the envelope in the manner
set forth, on Sunday, sufficient to charge the endorser ?" Subsequently the court entered judgment for the plaintiff on the verdict,
being of opinion that defendant having the notice in his possession with knowledge of its contents, on Monday, was equivalent to
a proper service on him on that day.
Defendant brought this writ of error.
1. -E.Beltzhoover and TV. F. Sadler, for plaintiff in error.
Henderson

Ilays,
l. for defendant in error.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
SHARSWOOD, J.-It is very important that the Acts of Assembly
providing for the observance of the Lord's day, commonly called
Sunday, should be enforced according to their true spirit and
meaning. We are not called upon to discuss the policy of these
statutes, but the legislature in the unquestionable exercise of their
constitutional power have enacted that one day in seven, the first
day of the week, shall be a day of rest when all worldly employment and business shall be intermitted. By the Act of 1705, § 4,
1 Smith L. 25, no person or persons upon the first day of the week
shall serve or execute or cause to be served or executed any writ,
precept, warrant, order, judgment or decree, except in case of
treason, felony or breach of the peace, but the serving of any such
writ, precept, warrant, order, judgment or decree shall be void to
all intents and purposes whatever. And the Act of April 22d
1794, § 1, 3 Smith 177, imposes a penalty upon any person who
shall do or perform any worldly employment or business whatever
on the Lord's day, commonly called Sunday (works of necessity
and charity excepted). It was said in Stern's Appeal, 14 P. F.
Smith 450, that judicial business in civil cases done on Sunday is
violative of the rule of the common law and our statutes, which
in fact are declarative of the common law. The notice from the
attorney of the party to the sheriff in that case was not an order
within the letter of the Act of 1705, though it is so termed in the.
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It was a mere notice to him to proceed according to his
duty under the writ of execution already in his hands. It cannot,
I think, be doubted that any other notice by party or counsel in
the course of legal proceedings would be equally ineffectual, nor
would it be necessary that a suit should be actually pending.
Notices are often required to fix the liability of a party. Thus,
notice to a magistrate before commencing a suit against him for
any act done by him in virtue of his office, surely could not be
served upon him on Sunday; nor would it matter that it would
have been in time if served on the following day. To fix an endorser with legal liability, a notice of non-payment is required;
it is a step in the legal proceedings though before the commencement of the suit. The party was not bound to receive or notice
such a communication, it is against the spirit of the Act of 1705
to permit itto have any effect; besides it was a part of the worldly
employment or business of the teller of the bank directly violative
of the Act of 1794, an unlawful act on his part, and fell within
the prohibition of that statute.
It is true that the English authorities hold that a notice of protest served on Sunday is to be considered as received on Monday:
Byles on Bills 224. But our Act of Assembly is more comprehensive in its terms than the English statute of 29 Charles 2, c.
7, which forbids only labor in one's "ordinary calling on Sunday,"
whereas the statute of 1794 is aimed against "any worldly employment or business Whatever :" Johnston v. The Commonwealth, 10
Harris 108; Omit v. The Commonwealth, 9 Id. 482; Kepner v.
Keefer, 6 Watts 238. If the plaintiff in error was not bound to
receive the notice on Sunday, neither was he bound to open and
read it on Monday. He said nothing to lull the officer of the bank
into security. The mere taking of the notice from his hands in
silence, though informed of what it was, cannot be construed into
an agreement to accept it and a waiver of the irregularity; we must
be careful not to open the door to exceptions which will fritter
away the plain provisions of the law. Especially is it in the construction of written statutes that hard cases have made bad precedents. Thus we have seen the Statutes of Uses, of Frauds and
Perjuries and of Limitations, almost judicially repealed by exceptions gradually introduced by constructions. In such cases it is a
safe rule obstaprincipiis.
Judgment .reversed, and venire faeias de novo awarded.
case.

TAYLOR v. STEAMBOAT COMMONWEALTI.

United States .District Court, Eastern -District of Mli8souri.
In Admiralty.
DANIEL G. TAYLOR, ADM., v. STEAMBOAT COMMONWEALTH.'
The existence or non-existence of a maritime lien for repairs is wholly independent of the port in which the repairs are made.
In a foreign port, a party making repairs or furnishing supplies to a vessel is
presumed to rely upon the credit of the vessel itself; but at the home port such a
presumption. does not exist, and it must appear affirmatively that the repairs were
made or the supplies furnished on the credit of the vessel and not on the credit of
the owners.
If the owners at the home-port are in good credit, no maritime lien is created.
At a foreign port the master is only authorized to have such repairs made
as will enable the vessel to pursue her voyage. At the home-port, the owners
are not thus restricted.

Tius was a libel in rem for repairs made to the steamboat
Commonwealth in her home-port.
The libellant, under the orders of the Probate Court of St.
Louis county, was charged with the duty of administering upon
the assets of a copartnership, known as the St. Louis Sectional
Dock Company-some of the partners having died. Under those
orders he was authorized to continue the operations of the docks
until they could be sold. Previously the superintendent, Henry
Adkins, had been accustomed to make contracts for the company
to dock and repair vessels. Upon entering upon the discharge of
his'official duties, the libellant gave public notice that no contracts
for the company would thereafter be recognised or deemed valid
unless expressly made or certified by him.
The steamboat Commonwealth was owned by a corporation, the
stockholders being the master of the boat, J. S. Suydam, J. N.
Bofinger and the copartnership of Stiliwell, Powell & Co., which
latter copartnership transferred its stock to McCord, a former
master.
Stillwell, Powell & Co. became bankrupts soon after
they transferred their shares of stock.
In that condition of affairs, the inspector of the board of underwriters at St. Louis informed the master, Suydam, that the boat
must be repaired in order to become seaworthy and pass inspection. Thereupon a cursory examination was had to ascertain the
probable cost of the needed repairs. Adkins reported that about
We are indebted to C. C. Whittelsey, Esq., late State Reporter, for the report of this ease.-ED. AM. LAW lREG.
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$6000 would be sufficient, and that the vessel was not in so bad a
condition as the inspector supposed. That fact having been reported to Bofinger, the boat was ordered on libellant's docks,
where she was stripped and examined. The result of that examination was a fuller estimate by Adkins, which he reported to
Bofinger and Suydam, viz., that making a liberal estimate the
cost of repairs would not probably exceed $13,000, but tha,
Captain Suydam thought that the expense would run up to
$14,000. At first Bofinger was inclined to tear up or "wreck "
the boat rather than incur so great an expense, but, on consultation with Suydam, consented to the repairs being made, with the
understanding on his part that the cost would not exceed the sum
stated. The further understanding was, that Suydam should
superintend the repairs on the part of the boat, which the inspector
would, as usual in such cases, be required to make. The report
made to tie libellant was that the boat was to be repainted-that
$5000 cash were to be paid as the work progressed-but if the
cost of repairs exceeded $15,000, then one-third of said cost
should be so paid in cash-the balance in either event to be in
good endorsed paper at thirty, sixty and ninety days. When the
report was thus made, the libellant assented to the terms and made
a memorandum accordingly.
Thereupon the inspector directed from time to time what work
should be done; and Captain Suydam sometimes objecting at first,
assented finally thereto, and th- whole cost of repairs while the
boat was on the daoks amounted to $21,298.72, of which $4229.63
were paid, leaving a balance claimed to be due of $17,069.09.
When the boat was put off the docks, because more cash had not
been paid as requested, about $2200 additional were needed to
complete the repairs.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
TREAT, D. J.-Upon the foregoing brief summary of facts several important propositions are presented; preliminary to which is
the question whether there was a specific contract between libellant and the claimant, that the former should do any prescribed or
designated amount of repairs at a fixed sum or within a named
time. Upon that point the court holds that the only contract on
the part of the libellant, was to dock the boat and make such repairs on her as might be designated from time to time, and on the
terms for payment above stated.
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1st. As the repairs were in the home port, the first point presented is whether a procceding in rem can be maintained. The
new twelfth rule settles that question. It is as follows:"In all suits by material-men for supplies or repairs, or other
necessaries, the libellant may proceed against the ship and freight
in rem, or against the master or owner alone in personam."
Grave questions are raised as to the true interpretation of that
rule in the light of the many adjudications had with respect to
supplies in the home and foreign ports, and in cases where the
owners are present or absent. It would require a more elaborate
discussion than can now be given, if this court should undertake
to analyze, historically or otherwise, the shifting views on those
points which have prevailed from time to time, and to comment
upon them with due regard to elemental principles. The last utterance of the United States Supreme Court indicates that, in accordance with the opinions generally expressed by bench and bkr,
for many years, it will hold as was done by this court last term,
and as was strongly intimated by the United States Circuit Court
here in 1857 (Hill & Conn v. Golden Gate, 6 Am. Law Reg.
0. S. 273), that the existence or non-existence of a maritime lien
is wholly independent of the fact that the vessel was repaired in
the home instead of a foreign port.
The primary maxim is that, as a vesiel is made to plough the seas
instead of lying by the wall, whoever furnishes the necessary
means for prosecuting her voyage will have therefor a maritime
lien upon or tacit hypothecation of the vessel, unless the master
had adequate funds in the foreign port, or the ownerfj in such port,
or in the home port, had ample credit.
As this court ruled at the last term, so it now holds; that the
question as to maritime lien does not depend upon the port where
the repairs are made.
2d. In a foreign port the master has authority to order necessary repairs to enable the vessel to pursue her voyage. -As held
in the cases of The Graplshot, 9 Wall. 129; The Kalorama, 10
Wall. 204; The Lulu, 10 Wall. 192; The Patapeco,13 Wall. 333;
the necessity for credit upon the vessel whence a maritime lien
springs, must be presumed, where the master in a foreign port
orders repairs which are necessary; the burthen of showing the
contrary being thrown upon owner or contestant. That doctrine
was repeated by the United States Supreme Court at its last term,
in the case of The Merchants' Mutual Insurance Company v.
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Thomas Barring et al., Chicago Legal News, No. 299, page
309.
That court says: "Contracts fir supplies and repairs may be
made by the master to enable the vessel to proceed on her voyage,
and it appears that they were necessary for the purpose, and that
they were made and furnished to a. foreign vessel, or to a vessel
of the United States, in a port other than a port of the state to
which the vessel belongs. The primd facie presumption is that
the repairs and supplies were made and furnished on the credit of
the vessel, unless it appears that the master had funds on hand or
at his command which he ought to have applied to the accomplishment of those objects, and that the material-men knew the fact, or
that such facts and circumstances were known to them as were
sufficient to put them upon inquiry and to show that if they had
used due diligence in that behalf, they might have ascertained
that the master had no authority to contract for such repairs and
supplies on the credit of the vessel."
"Whenever the necessity for the repairs and supplies are once
made out, it is incumbent on the owners, if they allege that the
funds could have been obtained upon their personal cretlit, to establish that fact by competent proof, and that the material-men
knew the same or were put upon inquiry, as before explained,
unless those matters fully appear in the evidence introduced by the
other party."
This is the last opinion of the Supreme Court upon the subject,
and in it reference is made to the cases cited above, and also to
the case of Thomas v. Osborne, 19 Howard 22. The necessity
for repairs referred to is an apparent necessity-such as a reasonably prudent man, charged with the interests at stake, would make
for their safety. It is the good faith of those concerned that the
court considers. If the owner be present in the foreign port, it
has always been held that the presumption of necessity for relying
upon the credit of the vessel is repelled, and that, therefore, the
material-man must show that the owner had not the needed credit
in such foreign port. How rigorously the last rule might now be
applied, is not important to discuss. The master's authority in a
foreign port in the absence of the owner was always held to be
greater than in the presence of the latter.
3d. If the repairs and supplies are furnished in the home
port, where the owner resides, it may be safely asserted that the
master has no authority unless express-tbat is, unless he is duly
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authorized by the owners to order the same.

Abroad, the master

orders reasonably necessary repairs to enable the vessel to prosecute the undertaken voyage; for his authority to act springs from
the necessity.of the case in the absence of the owner. At home
the owner may order more than temporary repairs-whatever he
deems proper-not for one voyage, but for the permanent and
thorough overhauling of the vessel. The authority of the owner
is not limited as that of the master; he may, in the home port,
give his own orders in that respect, or intrust the master with full
power to act. There is, then, no cargo at risk-no pending
voyage. The owner's power over the vessel is not then confined
to merely what is essential to the success of a pending voyage.
Hence, in passing upon the necessity of repairs, ordered or authorized by an owner under such circumstances, a more liberal rule
should prevail. lIe is supposed to understand the necessity and
the policy of the repairs he orders to be made.
In the case under consideration, the owners of a large majority
of interest in the boat, including the president, were not only present here in the home port, but authorized the master, who was
also a large owner, to superintend the repairs. It seems to have
been conceded that what the inspector ordered as necessary was to
be done. The master and all others acted on that hypothesis.
The reason is manifest; for a boat upon which no insurance could
be had could procure no shipments, and would therefore be effectively tied up to the wall.
The necessity of repairs, then, in this, the home port, is, so far
as the material-man in this case is concerned, determined by the
orders given by the inspector and acquiesced in by the master.
Hence there was, in the meaning of the maritime rule, a necessity
for the repairs.
4th. Was there a necessity for relying upon the credit of the
vessel ? The reason for insisting upon this necessity, as well as
the necessity for repairs, has reference to the many interests which
are constantly springing up, creating maritime liens or tacit hypothecations where other than the owner's interests may be involved,
consequently, if he can, independent of the rights of others, fasten
these secret liens upon the vessel, those who, under these rules of
necessity, furnish repairs and supplies, may find themselves without supposed and adequate security. Still, that danger is less in
the home than in a foreign port, for in the former the voyage is at
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an end, while in the latter the voyac is in progress and its future
incidents cannot be predicted.
On the arrival of the vessel at her home port all who have demands against her can enforce them at once. If they choose to
lie by while she is undergoing repairs to fit her for new voyages,
they have no just ground for complaint, certainly not if the vessel,
before her departure, is seized and sold to answer the demands
against her. The new repairs are to be considered as giving enhanced value, and thus increasing the proceeds received from the
sale. Why, then, should the last material-man be deprived of the
fruits of his advances, or his additions to the vessel's value be appropriated to the payment of prior and unenforced demands?
But it is said that in this case the credit was not given solely to
the vessel, and that if it was there was no necessity for so doing.
The libellant swears that he would not have done the work solely
on the credit of the vessel; and therefore he insisted on part payment in cash as the work progressed, and good endorsed paper for
the balance. The boat's paper was finally offered in payment and
refused. When, in the course of the work, the proportionate cash
payments failed, the libellants, after repeated warnings, put the
vessel off the docks so soon as practicable, with due regard to her
safety, and ceased further repairs. The promised or understood
tender of endorsed paper was not made, and the material-man was
left unsecured in that way. Has he, because be insisted upon that
security from the beginning, been deprived of a lien on the boat?
'If he had received that security he could not have enforced his
demand in rem in any event until that paper matured, or, if negotiable, had been surrendered.
It seems that there is some misunderstanding upon this point.
The libellant swears that he did not consider the vessel alone
adequate security for the value of the work to be done, and therefore he insisted upon security which he never obtained. The conduct of the stockholders illustrates this point. They urged him
after his work was done to take the vessel as security for his unpaid balance, and he refused, insisting upon what he claimed was
the original agreement. He was thus left to make his demand out
of the vessel or her owner. The owner was a corporation with no
other property or assets, except this vessel, upon which there were
many liens already existing. The statements of witnesses as to
her value, independent of the repairs made by libellant, have very
I/(
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little force, for she was subject to seizure and sale to meet the existing liens upon her ; and after being repaired at the cost of the
owner ($21,000) brought at the marshal's sale less than $19,000.
The result of that sale shows that the libellant was prudent in deinanding more'than the credit of the vessel for his security. The
court cannot hold that because he agreed to receive other security,
which was never given, he is therefore deprived of all security
upon the vessel. The necessity for relying upon other credit than
that of the vessel is demonstrated from what has been said as to
the ownership. The stock of that corporation was owned by three
persons, andto say the least, it is a grave question whether that
fact could have the slightest effect upon the credit of the corporation. If these stockholders did not choose to make themselves
individually liable, how could.their personal credit give credit to
the corporation itself, which had none independent of this vessel
-the only property owned by it ?
The owner-the corporation-had no credit, and as it would
give no outside security, the libellant was compelled to fall back
on the partial and inadequate credit of the vessel itself.
There has been no attempt in this discussion to dwell upon the
fact that the owner was a corporation doing business in this port,
and to criticise the mode in which that corporate owner acted
through its president and the master of the vessel, who was the.
principal stockholder. The corporation did act through its president, and with the assent and co-operation of the master-those
two persons owning largely more than a majority of the stock. It
is apprehended that under such circumstances the rights of a
material-man cannot be defeated on the ground that a mere formal
or technical mode of assent or action by the corporation would be
proper. Its interests were controlled and managed by its president, and by a majority in interest, and, for all essential purposes,
the corporation did assent and act.
Whatever may have been the misunderstanding or expectations of
the president of the corporation, or of the master expressly intrusted with the superintendence of the repairs, as might be ordered
from time to time, the plaintiff expected to be paid therefor, part in
cash, as the work progressed, and the balance in good endorsed
paper. This is the more probable from the fact that his position was
merely fiduciary. Under the orders of the Probate Court specific
duties were imposed on him, requiring especial prudence and circum-
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spection. He was not intrusted with control of funds belonging to
the estate to be expended in work, for the payment of which no adequate security was given, but merely to prevent the cessation of business and consequent loss of the estate; he was requested to operate
the docks for a time with a view to their advantageous sale. In
other words, charged with a special trust, be was not at liberty t,,
act as if he were proprietor of the docks in his own right. Ilenc.
it seems, he insisted upon 'etaining the sole power to enter upon
or mate contracts. There was no *specific or expressed contract
as to the amount of work to be done or the time in which it
should be done; the implied contract was that such work should
be done as was requested from time to time at reasonable rates and
with reasonable promptitude; and on the terms above stated he is
entitled to recover accordingly.
This court holds that this marked distinction* exists as to maritime liens for repairs and supplies in foreign or home ports respectively, as follows:1. That while in foreign ports the presumption of a necessity
for relying upon the credit of the vessel for repairs arises from the
necessity of repairs to. enable the vessel to prosecute the voyage;
in home ports the presumption of a necessity for relying upon the
credit of the vessel does not exist.
2. That in a foreign port the master, as performing the duties of
that officer, has authority to bind the vessel and her owners for the
necessary expenses of the boat, but in the home port he has not
that right.
3. That while in a foreign port the necessary repairs are restricted to such as will enable the vessel to pursue her voyage with
safety, the repairs in the home port where they may be ordered by
the owners, are not of necessity restricted within such narrow
limits.
4. Those who in a home port furnish repairs and supplies must
,show affirmatively, in order to have a lien on the vessel, that it
was necessary to rely on the credit of the vessel, or in other words,
that the credit of the owners was not such as would justify a prudent man in furnishing the repairs and supplies solely on their
personal credit. Many persons in the home ports have been accustomed, in consequence of the state boat acts, to suppose that
repairs and supplies furnished there at the instance of the master
gave a lien irrespective of all other considerations, but as they-
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so far as they trespass upon admiralty jurisdiction-are void, it is
important that material-men in home ports bear in mind the distinction above stated, and the elements out of which a lien in a
home port springs.
If the owners are in good credit there is no necessity for relying
on the credit of the vessel, and, consequently, no lien is created.
In the ease on hearing it appears that the corporation had no
credit within the meaning of the rule, and therefore the libellant
had a right to rely upon the'credit of the vessel. His demand
must be allowed so far as proved and classed as a maritime lien.
The amount found to be due is $17,054.19. The stress has
been laid upon the fact that the boat was still in the possession of
the libellant when the libel was filed and the warrant in rem. As
to whether that strengthens his demand it is not necessary to
discuss.
It may be a serious and embarrassing question whether, the
ordinary rules governing corporations and stockholders are to be
rigidly recognised in admiralty. If three or more owners of a
vessel can become a corporation and transfer said vessel to the
corporation, each owner taking an equivalent proportion of stock
for his interest in the boat and only the corporation as such and
its corporate assets, viz., the vessel, be liable for maritime contracts
and maritime torts, of what practical force is the liability of the
owners in personam as well as of the vessel in rem P It is a well
settled rule that supplies furnished by a part owner do not give a
maritime lien, but if he in the manner stated, became a technical
stockholder instead of a technical owner, is the force of that important rule to be thus abrogated? True, a corporation may own
many vessels and be wholly responsible, and governed by the ordinary rules applied to corporations, but on the other band, as in
this case and in others frequently occurring, a few owners of a
vessel become a corporation, thus claiming exemption personally
from the duties of ownership. Will the courts of admiralty look
at the substance rather than the form-at the actual ownership
rather than the formal ? If they go behind the act of incorporation, will they in all cases treat the stockholders as owners, and if
not, where shall the line be drawn,'or what facts will justify going
behind the act of incorporation ?
In this case the cross libel is dismissed, $17,054.19 being
allowed libellant as maritime lien, and the costs being against the
claimant and intervenors.
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An insurance company having issued certain policies reinsured them in another
company. A loss occurred and subsequently the frst company became insolvent.
The second company then bought up some of the policies at a discount. 1eld:
I. That it was an investment within the corporate powers of the second company and not against public policy.
2. That in an action by the assignees in bankruptcy of the first company to
recover the amount of the reinsurance, the second company could set off the purchased policies at their face-value.

Tnis was a bill in equity. The facts appear in the opinion,
which was delivered by
SWING, D. J.-The petition in this case alleges that the Independent Insurance Company, prior to the 9th of October 1871, had
issued eight policies of insurance to eight several parties, and that
prior to that date the defendant, the Home Insurance Company,
for a valuable consideration, had issued to the said Independent
Insurance Company policies of reinsurance upon each of said
original policies of insurance in certain specified amounts.
That on the 9th and 10th days of October the property covered
by said policies of insurance was destroyed by fire; that the total
amount of adjusted loss upon said policies of reinsurance is
$36,672; that the proof of said loss was duly made, and notice
thereof given to defendant.
And that the said sum of $36,672 is due and owing thereon
from the defendant to the plaintiffs.
The defendant pleads the general issue, and files notice of setoff, in substance, that before the petition in bankruptcy bad been
filed, it had become, by purchase and assignment, the owner of
five of the original policies of insurance reinsured by them, to
wit: That to the Western News Company for $10,000; that to
Henry W. King & Co. for $15,000; that to Simpson, Norwell &
Co. for $5000; that to Hotchkin, Palmer & Co. for $2500; and
that to C. P. Kellogg & Co. for $5000.
That the property covered by these policies of insurance was
lost and destroyed by fire; that due and legal proof of loss had
been made, and notice thereof duly given; that the total amount
of the adjusted loss upon the five policies was $33,553.56, and
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asks to have said sum set off against the plaintiffs' demand; admits a balance due the plaintiffs of $3139.66, which defendant
claims to have tendered the plaintiffs. The reply is a general
denial. The agreed statement of facts shows that the Independent
Insurance Company issued the original policies of insurance, and
the defendant issued the policies of reinsurance; that the property
covered by the policies was destroyed by fire; that due and legal
proof of loss was made, and notice thereof legally given, and that
the amount of loss covered by the reinsurance was $36,672.
It further shows that the defendant purchased and had assigned
to it the five policies set forth in the notice of set-off; that due
and legal proof of loss was made, and notice thereof given plaintiffs, and that notice of the purchase and assignment was given by
the defendant to the plaintiffs ; that the amount of the adjusted
loss upon the Aive policies of insurance was $33,553.56 ; that they
were purchased at 25 to 40 per cent., and for the purpose of setting off the same against the demand of the plaintiffs.
And that at the time of the purchase of said policies the Independent Insurance Company was insolvent, and the agents of
defendant making such purchase, had reasonable cause to believe
it was so insolvent.
It also appears, from the agreed statement and the evidence in
the case, that proceedings under the insolvent laws of Massachusetts were instituted against said company in the courts of said state
on the 2d day of December 1871, for the purpose of winding
up the affairs of said company, and on the 9th day of January,
A. D. 1872, an order was made appointing trustees for that purpose,
but that, prior to the time of making said order, but on the same
day, a petition in bankruptcy was filed against the company, upon
which adjudication was made, and under which plaintiffs were
chosen assignees. Upon this statement of facts plaintiffs would
be entitled to recover the amount of their demand, unless the ,defendant is entitled to have set off against this amount, the amount
of the adjusted losses upon the five policies purchased by it.
Is, then, the defendant entitled to have them set off?
This the plaintiffs deny for two reasons.
First, That the defendant had no corporate powerto purchase
and take an assignment of said policies for the purpose of set-off.
Second, That the Independent Insurance Company being insolvent, and the pendency of insolvent proceedings against it, and
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the probabilities of proceedings in bankruptcy-with a full knowledge of these by defendant-it could not purchase the same to be
set off against the claim of the plaintiffs.
In support of the first proposition it is said that corporations
can exercise only such powers as are expressly granted, or which
are clearly implied from those expressly granted, and that the
power to make the purchase and take the assignment of these
policies is neither expressly granted nor implied from powers expressly granted; and in support of this we are referred to the 10th
section of the Act of 1856, which provides that "It shall be lawful for such company to loan or invest any part of its capital stock,
money, or other funds in such way as .the directors shall deem best
for the safety and interest of the stockholders, and to sell and
dispose of any interest which the company may have acquired by
any such loan or investment :" 1 Swan & Critchfield 362.
We are further referred to the 6th sect. of Act of 15th of April
1867, by which it is provided that "It shall be lawful for any insurance company organized under this act, or incorporated under
any law of this state, to invest its capital and the funds accumulated in the course of its business, or any part thereof, in bonds
and mortgages, on any unencumbered real estate within the state
of Ohio worth fifty per cent. more than the sum loaned thereon,
exclusive of the buildings, unless such buildings are insured and
the policy transferred to said company, and also in the stocks of
this state, or stocks or treasury notes of the United States, and
-also in the stocks or bonds of any county or incorporated city in
this state, authorized to issue by the legislature, and to lend the
same or any part thereof, on the security of such stocks or bonds
or treasury notes, or upon bonds and mortgages as aforesaid, and
to change and reinvest the same as occasibn may, from time to
time, require; but any surplus money over and above the capital
stock of such insurance companies, or any insurance companies
incorporated under any laws of this state, may be invested in or
loaned upon the pledge of the public stock or bonds of the United
States, or any one of the states, or the stocks, bonds or other evidences of indebtedness of any solvent dividend-paying institutions
incorporated under the laws of this state or of the United States,
except their own stock ; provided, always, that the current market
value of such stocks, bonds, or other evidences of indebtedness,
VoL
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shall be, at all times during the continuance of said-loans, at least
ten per cent. more than the sum loaned thereon."
It is also claimed that section 10 of the Act of 1856 has been
construed by the Supreme Court of the state, in the case of Straus
v. Eagle Insuwance Co., 5 Ohio St. R. 59. That by that construction no power existed in the defendant to make such purchase and
to take such assignment, and that we must follow such construction. In the case of Pea8e v. Peck, 18 Howard 598, Justice
CURTIS says: "There are, it is true, many dicta to be found in
our decisions, averring that the courts of the United States are
bound to follow the decisions of the state courts on construction
of their own laws. But although this may be a correct, yet a
rather strong expression of a general rule, it cannot be received
as the enunciation of a maxim of universal application. Accordingly, our reports furnish many cases of exceptions to it."
And again in the case of Butz v. City of Mucatiize, 8 Vallace 583, Justice SwAYwN says: "Where the settled decisions in
relation to a statute, local in its character, have become rules of
property, these remarks have no application. In such cases this
court will, as it always has done, follow such adjudications. The
cases of a different character, involving state statutes, in which
the adjudications of the courts of the 'states in relation to them
have been departed from by this court extend in an unbroken
series from an early period after its organization to the present
time."
In the light of these authorities, the general application of the
rule *maywell be doubted, and its special application to the present
case is exceedingly doubtful; for it can hardly be claimed that
this decision has become a rule of property.
But admitting the rule as claimed by plaintiffs, how does the
decision apply to the facts of this case ? In the case before the
Supreme Court of Ohio, the proof was a conditional purchase of
notes by the insurance company, for the purpose of setting them
off against an amount due upon a policy of insurance to the
maker of the notes. No money was paid, and the entire syllabus
of the case shows the decision to be confined to the case made by
the proof.
It is true, the learned judge delivering the opinion of the court,
says: "that it (the corporation) had no power to become a party
to the contract of endorsement by which it obtained the notes in
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question, and no capacity to take or hold the legal title."

But

even this language must, we think, be considered as applying to
the case before the court, and so the Supreme Court of the state
in the subsequent case of White's Bank of Buffalo v. Toledo Insurance Co., 12 Ohio St. R. 610, clearly indicate; for, in speaking
of the opinion of the court in that case, Judge PEcK says: "But,
while we concede there was such an abuse of power as would pre.vent the relief asked, we are not prepared to hold that where the
endorsement is one which, under certaini circumstances, the company might lawfully accept, in other words, where there was a
mere abuse and not a total want of power, that such endorsement
will be null and void for all purposes and for all persons."
But the extent to which a decision is of binding authority is
very clearly stated in the case of Cohen v. State of Virginia, 6
Wheaton 399, and afterwards affirmed by the Supreme Court in
the case of Carrollv. Lessee of Carroll, 16 Howard 287. Chief
Justice MARSHALL, in delivering the opinion of the court in the
former case, says: "It is a maxim not to be disregarded, that
general expressions in every opinion are to be taken in connection
with the case in which those expressions are used. If they go
beyond the case they may be respected, but ought not to control
the judgment in a subsequent suit when the very point is presented.
The reason of this maxim is obvious. The question actually before the court is investigated with care and considered in its full
extent; other principles, which may serve to illustrate it, are considered in their relation to the case decided, but their possible
bearing on all other cases is seldom completely investigated."
The facts of the present case show that the Independent Insurance Company had issued certain policies of insurance; that the
defendant had reinsured it against loss on the same; that loss upon
the original policies had occurred by which defendant had become
liable to pay upon their policies of reinsurance, transactions which,
to some extent, were connected together. The original insurance
was the foundation upon which the reinsurance rested, out of which
it originated, and there could have been no right of recovery upon
the reinsurance until a liability to pay the original insurance had
arisen.
The loss had taken place; the liability to pay the original insurance had been fixed, by which the defendant had become liable
to pay the reinsurance. The company issuing the original policies

HOVEY XT AL. v. HOME INSURANCE CO.

of insurance was insolvent, and the holders of them were selling
them for twenty-five per cent. Was it not, under such circumstances, "for the safety and interest of the stockholders" of the
Home Insurance Company, that the directors of the company
should invest so much of the funds of the same, as would be
necessary for the purchase of the original policies at their selling
price, rather than to permit them to pass into the hands of others,
by which they would have been compelled to pay their full amount?
I think it was, and that such an investment, purchase and
transfer was within their corporate power and consistent with
public policy.
But, admitting the power to make the purchases and receive the
assignments, can the policies be set off against the plaintiff's
demand?
The 20th section of the bankrupt law provides "That in all
cases of mutual debts or mutual credits between the parties, the
account between them shall be stated, and one debt set off against
the other, and the balance only shall be allowed or paid; but no
set-off shall be allowed of a claim in its nature not provable
against the estate; provided, that no set-off shall be allowed in
favor of any debtor to the bankrupt of any claim purchased by or
transferred to him after the filing of the petition."
Itis not denied that the policies were purchased and transferred
before the filing of the petition, and that they were provable
claims against the estate of the bankrupt, thus coming, as we
think, clearly within the letter of the provisions of this section.
It is said, however, that this section was not intended to enlarge
the right of set-off, as it existed prior to its passage. That as the
law was then established, these claims haying been purchased with
a knowledge of the insolvency, of the pendency of the proceedings in Massachusetts, and the expected .proceedings in bankruptcy,
and for the purposes of set-off, they could not have been set off.
It may be admitted that the decisions of the courts of the
several states have not been uniform upon this question. Those
of Louisiana, and a portion of those of New York and Massachusetts, holding that under such circumstances set-off could not
have been allowed, whilst a portion of both New York and Massachusetts recognise a different doctrine. And the doctrine of set-off,
as recognised by the Supreme Court of Missouri, in the case of
Morrow v. Bright, 20 Missouri 351, and of the Court of Appeals
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of Kentucky, in Kinnell v. .Nesbit, would, we think, admit the setoff.
In Massachusetts, up to the time of the decision of the case of
Smith v. Hill, 8 Gray 572, it did not seem to have been seriously
doubted by their courts that all claims existing against an insolvent's estate at the time of the commencement of the proceedings
in insolvency, could be set off. But this decision holds a different
doctrine, and yet the case may have been well decided, without
such ruling. For in that case* Kibbs, the insolvent, at the time
Hill purchased the goods and gave his notes, was in failing circumstances and unable to pay his debts. And that Hill bought
the goods upon condition that the note should be placed in the
hands of a third party for the equal benefit of all his creditors, so
as to avoid any question as to the legality of the case. They were
given and placed in the hands of an attorney, who accepted the
trust, and many of the creditors of Kibbs sent their claims to the
attorney and received their proportion of the proceeds of said
notes.
It was a part of the contract of sale that this trust should be
created in favor of the other creditors, and certainly no court
would have permitted the defendant under such circumstances to
defeat a trust which he himself had created, so that the general
question was not necessarily involved in the case.
Whatever may be the effect of these several decisions, the bankrupt law intended to establish a uniform rule in regard to set-off,
which would be the same in every state. It is said, however, that
the great object of the bankrupt law was to secure an equal distribution of the property of the bankrupt among all the creditors,
and permitting a set-off in a case of this -character would defeat
that object.
But would it any more defeat it than if a creditor, who knows
of the utter insolvency of a debtor, is permitted to bring his suit
against him, to prosecute it to final judgment, issue his execution,
and seize every dollar's worth of his property, have it sold and
put the proceeds in his own pocket, to the exclusion of every other
creditor? And yet the Supreme Court of the United States, in
the case of Wilson v. Gity Bank of St. Paul,17 Wall. 478, has
decided, under the Bankrupt Law, this can be done.
And again, prior to the passage of the Bankrupt Law, an insolvent debtor could transfer all his property to a single creditor
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who had full knowledge of the debtor's insolvency, with intenit on
the part of the debtor of giving, and on the part of the creditor
of receiving, a preference over all other creditors, and this the
Bankrupt Law interferes with only when the transaction has
taken place within a limited period of time before the filing of
,the petition, and it specifies particularly what transactions shall
be a fraud upon the Bankrupt Law. In all of which the act of
the bankrupt, his motive and intent, are essential elements; but in
the purchase and transfer of the claim to be set off, he has nothing
whatever to do. He neither makes, procures, or suffers the purchase and transfer.
Now, if one creditor can fairly go into the courts and by their
process take from the remaining creditors every dollar of the
bankrupt's estate, knowing the insolvency, intending to produce
the preference, and the bankrupt in the mean time, with full
knowledge of his condition and the result of the act of his creditor,
why may not the debtor of the bankrupt honestly and fairly go
into the market and purchase from the creditors of the bankrupt
their claims and have them set off? Could Congress have intended
any other limitations than those expressly provided, a mutual debt
or credit, which was provable against the estate of the bankrupt,
and which had been purchased and transferred- before the filing of
the petition ?
To say that Congress intended the additional condition, that it
had been purchased without the knowledge of insolvency, would
be to place the purchaser of a bill, bond or note of the bankrupt
in a worse position than the man, who, with the aid and assistance
of the bankrupt, had secured a preference by a conveyance of all
the bankrupt's property, for in the latter case the law limits the
time within which it may be declared fraudulent and void to four
months; but in the former there is no limitation; it may have
been purchased within four months or four years, but it is not
protected.
And again, it would open a wide field of litigation to establish
the questions of insolvency and knowledge.
But how stands the question of construction upon authority ?
Four decisions construing this section, have been cited. That
of Hitchcock v. Rolla, decided by Judges DRUMMOND and BLODGETT, reported in the 6th vol. Chicago Legal News, page 9, and
that of In re i6ty Bank of Savings, by Judge HOFFMAN, 6 B.
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Reg. 71. The case of Hopkins' Trustees v. Jackson, decided by
this court, and the case of iSawyer v. Hoag, decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, 17 Wall. 610.
The cases of the Savings Bank and Hopkins' Trustees were in
favor of the set-off, and that of Hitchcock v. Rolla and Sawyer v.
Hoag were cited as against the set-off.
As to the reasoning and authority of the first two cases I shall
say nothing. As to the third case, it was a bill in equity, and the
Court says, the fair inference is that the claim was merely transferred to enable the holder to realize in full his claim, and that it
was incumbent on him to show that he was more than the nominal
owner.
And the reasoning of the learned judge, based upon the theory that the Bankrupt Law rests upon the principle of an equal
distribution of the property of the bankrupt, would apply with equal
force against the decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States. in case of Wilson v. Bank &. Paul,17 Wall. 473. And
furtheri the recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States, in case of Sawyer v. Hoag, deciding that the capital stock
of such company was a trust for the benefit of the general creditors, prevents the evil resulting from a ruling different from that
made by the Court in the case.
As to the case of Sawyer v. Hoag, I do not regard the decision
in the light in which it is viewed by the learned counsel for the
plaintiffs.
If the Supreme Court had given to the 20th section the construction contended for, there would have been no necessity of determining the character of the indebtedness of Sawyer, for it was an
admitted fact that he knew of the insolvency of the company, when
he purchased the certificate. That he purchased it for 331 per
cent., and for the purpose of set-off. So that no matter what the
character of this debt, under the construction claimed no set-off
could have been allowed.
But the" Supreme Court says the first and most important question to be decided is, whether the indebtedness of the appellant to
the insurance company is to be treated, for the purposes of this
suit, as really based on a loan of money by the company to him,
or as representing his unpaid stock or subscription ?
Having determined this most important question, that the debt
was a part of the, stock of the company, and, therefore, a trust
fund for the benefit of the general creditors of the corporation,
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they decide as against such a fund, the set-off could not be allowed, and their construction of the 20th section must be taken as
applying to a case of the character they found the one before them
to be. So that rather than being an authority in favor of the
construction claimed by plaintiff, it would seem to be one strongly,
inferentially at least, against it.
The English and American bankrupt laws differ in this, that the
English Bankrupt Law has relation to the commission of an act
of bankruotcy, and the American to the filing of the petition.
So fir as I have been able to learn the decisions of the English
courts, they have been uniform in holding that knowledge of insolvency did not prevent a set-off. Among the numerous authorities upon that point, I shall only refer to two. In Hawkin8 v.
W thiten, 10 B. & C. 223, BAYLEY, J., says: "Notice of an insolvency, therefore, or notice of stoppage, are no longer ingredients upon this point. Notice of an act of bankruptcy is alone
the criterion or dividing point, and before this period, Whitten
takes the notes he claims to set off, and thereby becomes a creditor
of the bankrupts and they became his debtors. It may be true,
and is, that he took these notes for the very purpose of making
them the subject of the set-off and of getting in substance 20s.
in the pound upon these notes ; but as this has not been prohibited,
we cannot say that it is illegal."
In the case of Dickson v. Ca8s, 1 B. & Ad. 354, BAYLEY, J.,
says: "The next question arises on the claim made by defendant
to set off the sum of 5101., being the amount of notes issued by the
banking house and taken in payment by R. Cass and Smart, after
they knew the bankers were in a state of insolvency or had suspended their payment, but before they knew that any member of
the firm had committed an act of bankruptcy. Hawkins v.
Whitten, 10 B. & C. 217, is a decisive authority to show that
they are entitled to deduct that sum from the debt claimed by the
plaintiffs. There the defendants claimed to set off notes of the
Wellingborough Bank, which he had industriously obtained after
the bank had stopped payment, and it was held that he had a
right to set off the notes, they having been taken before he knew
they had committed an act of bankruptcy."
In addition to the American cases cited, I think the case of
BSmith v.Brinkerhoof, 8 Barbour 519, recognises the right of setoff in bankruptcy, as limited only by the filing of the petition.

